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Summary
One of the most contentious issues in budget procedure in recent years has
involved proposed changes in the Senate’s “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) rule and
efforts to establish a similar rule in the House.  This controversy led to an impasse
between the House and Senate over the FY2005 budget resolution and surfaced again
during consideration of the FY2006 budget resolution.  The issue focuses principally
on whether tax-cut legislation, even though it may worsen the deficit, should be
exempted from a deficit-neutral PAYGO requirement.
The Senate’s PAYGO rule currently prohibits the consideration of revenue or
direct spending legislation that would cause (or increase) an on-budget deficit for any
one of three applicable time periods:  (1) the first fiscal year covered by the budget
resolution; (2) the first five fiscal years covered by the budget resolution; and (3) the
next five fiscal years after that.  Revenue reductions, direct spending increases, or a
combination of the two are allowed only so long as they are completely offset by
revenue increases, direct spending reductions, or both.  The rule does not apply,
however, to revenue reductions or direct spending increases assumed in the budget
resolution.  A point of order raised under the rule may be waived by an affirmative
vote of 60 Senators.  The rule is scheduled to expire at the end of FY2008.
Neither the Senate’s PAYGO rule, nor proposals for such a rule in the House,
address increases or decreases in revenues or direct spending that are reflected in the
calculations of the budget baseline; the rule applies only to the  effects of legislation
that is pending.  Therefore, revenue decreases or spending increases that stem from
existing law are not constrained by the rule.
Following the establishment of the PAYGO rule in 1993, the Senate has
modified the rule several times for different reasons, including establishing and
extending an expiration date, expanding the rule’s application to curtail potential
evasion, allowing on-budget surpluses to be “used” to cover revenue reductions and
direct spending increases, and providing for exemptions to the rule.  Proposals to
modify the Senate’s PAYGO rule or to establish a PAYGO rule in the House raise
several issues, including the appropriate coverage of the rule and the provision for
exemptions, and the period for which the rule should be in effect, among others.
In 2005, during consideration of the FY2006 budget resolution, S.Con.Res. 18,
the Senate addressed the issue.  It rejected a proposed modification to its PAYGO
rule (in the form of amendment 186, offered by Senator Russell Feingold) on a 50-50
tie vote.  In addition, the House rejected a proposal to establish a PAYGO rule of its
own (in the form of an amendment offered by Representative John Spratt) during
consideration of the budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 95.  Both proposals would have
subjected revenue and direct spending legislation to PAYGO requirements, but
without exempting any initiatives assumed in the budget resolution, effective through
September 30, 2010 (Feingold) or December 31, 2015 (Spratt).
This report will be updated as developments warrant.
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PAYGO Rules for Budget Enforcement
in the House and Senate
One of the most contentious issues in budget procedure in recent years has
involved proposed changes in the Senate’s PAYGO rule, which dates to 1993 and
deals with the enforcement of revenue and direct spending legislation, and efforts to
establish a similar rule in the House.  The controversy over this matter was so great
that it led to an impasse between the House and Senate regarding the FY2005 budget
resolution.  In 2005, during House and Senate consideration of the FY2006 budget
resolution, proposals regarding PAYGO rules once again raised controversy in the
two chambers.
Background
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344;
88 Stat. 297-339) established the congressional budget process, under which the
House and Senate develop an overall budgetary plan in the form of an annual budget
resolution.  The policies established each year in the budget resolution regarding
revenues, discretionary spending (controlled in annual appropriations acts), direct
spending (controlled in substantive law), and the debt limit are enforced largely
through such means as points of order (e.g., against legislation that would cause
spending to exceed the total limits established in the budget resolution or applicable
committee spending allocations) and reconciliation procedures.1
Pursuant to “elastic clause” authority under the 1974 act, the House and Senate
sometimes include special procedural features in the budget resolution.2  The
Senate’s “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) rule was established in 1993 under such
authority, on a temporary basis, as part of the FY1994 budget resolution.3  The rule




5 For additional information on this topic, see CRS Report RL31137, Sequestration
Procedures Under the 1985 Balanced Budget Act, by Robert Keith.
6 See CRS Report RS21378, Termination of the “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAYGO) Requirement
for FY2003 and Later Years, by Robert Keith.
to expire at the end of FY2008 (i.e., on September 30, 2008).  The current text of the
Senate’s PAYGO rule is provided in Appendix A.  Several unsuccessful efforts have
been made using this authority to establish a PAYGO rule in the House as well.
As formulated in the Senate, the PAYGO rule generally has prohibited the
consideration of any revenue or direct spending legislation that would cause (or
increase) an on-budget deficit for any one of three applicable time periods:  (1) the
first fiscal year covered by the budget resolution; (2) the first five fiscal years covered
by the budget resolution; and (3) the next five fiscal years after that.  (The budget
resolution encompasses on-budget revenues and spending only; it excludes the
budgetary transactions of the off-budget Social Security trust funds and Postal
Service Fund.)  Revenue reductions, direct spending increases, or a combination of
the two are allowed only so long as they are completely offset by revenue increases,
direct spending reductions, or both.  In its current form, however, the Senate’s
PAYGO rule does not apply to any revenue reductions or direct spending increases
that are assumed in the budget resolution.  Any Senator may raise a point of order
against legislation violating the rule, but the rule may be waived upon the affirmative
vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators, if no seats are vacant).
Neither the Senate’s PAYGO rule, nor proposals for such a rule in the House,
address increases or decreases in revenues or direct spending that are reflected in the
calculations of the budget baseline; the rule applies only to the  effects of legislation
that is pending.  Therefore, revenue decreases or spending increases that stem from
existing law are not constrained by the rule.
For many years, the Senate’s PAYGO rule complemented a statutory PAYGO
requirement established by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (as an amendment
to underlying law, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985),
which was first effective for FY1992.  Under the statutory PAYGO requirement, the
net budgetary impact of revenue and direct spending legislation in current and future
fiscal years was recorded on a rolling PAYGO scorecard.  If the director of the Office
of Management and Budget determined at the end of each congressional session that
revenue and direct spending legislation enacted for the immediate fiscal year yielded
a net cost (when added to any existing balance already recorded on the PAYGO
scorecard), then across-the-board cuts in nonexempt direct spending programs would
occur automatically to eliminate the net cost, thereby reducing the balance to zero,
under a procedure known as sequestration.5
The statutory PAYGO requirement was extended twice, but effectively was
terminated at the end of the 2002 session, when the out-year balances on the PAYGO
scorecard (through FY2006) were set to zero.6  No sequester of direct spending
CRS-3
7 See CRS Report RL31155, Techniques for Preventing a Budget Sequester, by Robert
Keith.
8 See the joint explanatory statement in H.Rept. 103-48, p. 47.  The reconciliation bill
enacted later that session, P.L. 103-66 (the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993),
was estimated at the time as reducing the deficit by about $500 billion over FY1994-
FY1998.
9 See Section 23 of H.Con.Res. 218 in the conference report to accompany the resolution,
H.Rept. 103-490, May 4, 1994, pp. 18-19 (legislative text) and pp. 54-56 (joint explanatory
statement).
programs ever occurred while the statutory PAYGO requirement was in effect.  This
is attributable, in the earlier years, to effective compliance, and in the later years, to
statutory intervention in the process using directed scorekeeping provisions and other
techniques.7
 The Senate’s PAYGO rule differs from the expired statutory PAYGO
requirement in that  it applies during the consideration of legislation, rather than after
the session has ended.  Both mechanisms, however, adopted a long-term approach
to enforcement — the PAYGO rule, by virtue of its 10-year time frame, and the
statutory PAYGO requirement, by virtue of recording future-year costs on the rolling
scorecard.
Different Formulations of the PAYGO Rule in the Senate
Following the establishment of the PAYGO rule in 1993, the Senate has
modified it several times.  The changes in the rule have occurred for several reasons,
including the establishment and extension of an expiration date, expanding the rule’s
application to annual appropriations acts in an effort to curtail potential evasion,
allowing on-budget surpluses to be “used” to cover revenue reductions and direct
spending increases, and providing for exemptions to the rule.  These different
formulations, which are summarized in Table 1 at the end of this section, have varied
in their effects on the stringency of the rule.
The original rule, Section 12(c) of the FY1994 budget resolution (H.Con.Res.
64), was intended to prevent the deficit reduction expected to be achieved in a
subsequent reconciliation bill from being used to offset the costs of any new direct
spending or revenue legislation.8  Specifically, it prohibited the consideration of any
direct spending and revenue legislation that would increase the deficit in the FY1994
budget resolution for any fiscal year through FY1998, or would increase the deficit
for any other fiscal year through FY2003.  In this initial form, the Senate’s PAYGO
rule had no expiration date.
The following year, in 1994, the Senate modified the PAYGO rule to require
direct spending and revenue legislation to be deficit neutral for any one of the three
time periods contained in the current PAYGO rule:  (1) the first fiscal year covered
by the most recently adopted budget resolution; (2) the first five fiscal years covered
by the budget resolution; and (3) the next five fiscal years after that.9  In addition, the
modification provided that direct spending and revenue legislation would violate the
rule only if it increased the deficit individually and also increased the deficit when
CRS-4
10 See Section 202 of H.Con.Res. 67 in the conference report to accompany the resolution,
H.Rept. 104-159, June 26, 1995, pp. 26-27 (legislative text) and p. 91 (joint explanatory
statement).
11 Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook:  Fiscal Years 2000-
2009, January 1999, Summary Table 1, p. xiv.
12 See Section 207 of H.Con.Res. 68 in the conference report to accompany the resolution,
H.Rept. 106-91, Apr. 14, 1999, pp.  20-21 (legislative text) and pp. 72-73 (joint explanatory
statement).
13 Congress did not complete action on an FY2003 budget resolution.  The Senate Budget
Committee reported a FY2003 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 100), but the Senate did not
consider it.
14 The Senate agreed by unanimous consent to S.Res. 304, as amended by the modified
amendment offered by Senators Kent Conrad, Pete Domenici, Judd Gregg, and Russell
Feingold (amendment 4886).  See Congressional Record (daily ed.), Oct. 16, 2002, pp.
S10527-S10531 and S10553.  The legislation also restored and extended through Apr. 15,
2003, the three-fifths vote requirement for certain waivers of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974. 
15 See Section 505 of H.Con.Res. 95 in the conference report to accompany the resolution,
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combined with any legislation enacted since the enactment of the previous year’s
reconciliation legislation (i.e., the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993).
This modification to the rule basically permitted the use of any deficit reduction
provided in other legislation to be used as an offset for any subsequent deficit-
increasing legislation.  The 1994 modification also added an expiration date of
September 30, 1998.  In 1995, the Senate reaffirmed the existing PAYGO rule and
extended its expiration date to September 30, 2002.10
  After decades of on-budget deficits, the federal government recorded a small
on-budget surplus for FY1999.  At that time, baseline budget projections showed on-
budget surpluses increasing each year well into the future.11  In 1999, reflecting the
change in the federal government’s budget outlook, the Senate modified the PAYGO
rule to allow on-budget surpluses to be used to offset tax reductions or spending
increases.12  Specifically, the modified rule prohibited the consideration of any direct
spending and revenue legislation that would cause (or increase) an on-budget deficit
for any one of the three existing applicable time periods.  The modification retained
the existing expiration date of September 30, 2002.
In 2002, the rule was allowed to expire on September 30.13  Two weeks later,
however, on October 16, 2002, the Senate restored and extended the PAYGO rule
through April 15, 2003.14  The basic formulation of the rule was retained with one
addition.  It was expanded to cover any direct spending or revenues included in
appropriations acts, effectively curtailing the use of such measures potentially to
evade the rule (due to expired discretionary spending limits and the absence of a
budget resolution for FY2003).
Finally, in 2003, with the adoption of the FY2004 budget resolution, the Senate
modified and extended the rule through September 30, 2008.15
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H.Rpt. 108-71, Apr. 10, 2003, pp. 29-30 (legislative text) and pp. 122-123 (joint explanatory
statement).
16 The joint explanatory statement in the conference report to accompany the FY2004 budget
resolution indicated that the budget resolution assumed direct spending increases and
revenue reductions totaling $1,755.957 billion over the period FY2003-FY2013.  See
H.Rept. 108-71, Apr. 10, 2003, pp. 122-123.
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Exemption provided for revenue
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assumed in the budget resolution.
Application of rule to annual
appropriations acts terminated.
The modified rule retains the ban on the consideration of direct spending or
revenue legislation that would cause (or increase) an on-budget deficit in any one of
three time periods mentioned above.  Under the rule in this current form, however,
legislation implementing the direct spending or revenue policy changes assumed in
the most recently adopted budget resolution is exempt from a point of order, even
though it might be projected to cause or increase an on-budget deficit.16  The
modification also eliminated the application of the rule to annual appropriations acts
(which were subject to limits established in the budget resolution for FY2004).
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Reconciliation legislation considered later in 2003 (S. 1054 and H.R. 2), for
example, although projected at the time to increase the deficit, did not violate the rule
because it was consistent with the reconciliation instructions contained in Title II of
the budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 95 (108th Congress).
Selected Issues Regarding PAYGO Rules
Proposals to modify the Senate’s PAYGO rule or to establish a PAYGO rule in
the House raise several issues, including the appropriate coverage of the rule and the
provision for exemptions, and the period for which the rule should be in effect,
among others.  Several selected issues are discussed briefly below.
Coverage and Exemptions.  With regard to the appropriate coverage of the
PAYGO rule and exemptions to it, attention has focused on whether it should apply
to direct spending legislation, but not revenue legislation, and whether the exemption
for initiatives assumed in the budget resolution should be retained.
Those who advocate the broadest coverage of the rule point to the need to
reduce the deficit, which has climbed to record levels in nominal terms ($412 billion
in FY2004, and possibly higher for FY2005 as the year unfolds) and is expected to
persist above the $200 billion threshold at least through FY2010.  In order to grapple
effectively with deficit-reduction challenges, they argue, the House and Senate must
ensure that their budget enforcement tools encompass the entire budget and that no
portion of it escapes discipline.
Further, advocates of a broadened approach cite the effectiveness of the Senate’s
PAYGO rule, as well as the statutory PAYGO requirement, during the early and mid-
1990s, before budget surpluses emerged.  During this period, these two enforcement
mechanisms applied to both revenue and direct spending legislation.
An amendment offered by Senator Russell Feingold to the FY2006 budget
resolution in March 2005 embodied this approach.  His amendment would have
restored the Senate’s PAYGO rule to its earlier form, under which it applied equally
to revenue legislation and direct spending legislation and did not exempt legislation
assumed in the budget resolution.
Senator Lincoln Chafee, speaking in support of the Feingold amendment, stated:
Pay-go is not perfect.  Congress has found, and will continue to find if it is
included in this budget, ways to get around it.  But, despite its flaws, it does have
a proven track record.  It tests policies of both parties in the same way — pay for
your priorities, or find 60 Senators willing to override the rule.  This is the way
it should be.  At a time when our budget is awash in red ink it only makes sense
to bring discipline and accountability back to the budget process.  If new tax cuts
or entitlement spending is so important, shouldn’t we be able to find a way to
address the costs?  Including pay-go in the budget made sense in the 1990’s,
CRS-7
17 See the remarks of Senator Lincoln Chafee in the Congressional Record (daily ed.), Mar.
16, 2005, pp. S2803-S2804.
18 See the remarks of Senator Charles Grassley in the Congressional Record (daily ed.), Mar.
16, 2005, pp. S2798-S2799.
when the stock market was at historic highs and unemployment at historic lows,
and it makes sense today.17
Those who point to a need for a more narrow application of the PAYGO rule
argue mainly that it should not apply to revenue legislation, either by restricting its
application solely to direct spending legislation, or, as the current rule provides, by
exempting legislation assumed in the budget resolution.  A key element in sustaining
economic growth and achieving longer-term budgetary goals, they assert, is
extending the various tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 that are scheduled to expire
over the next several years, and possibly reducing revenues further in other ways.  A
PAYGO rule applicable to revenue legislation generally, and that does not
automatically exempt tax-cut legislation assumed in the budget resolution, could
significantly impede this effort, especially in light of the rule’s 60-vote threshold for
waiver.
During consideration of the FY2006 budget resolution, Senator Charles
Grassley, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, spoke in opposition to the
Feingold amendment.  He expressed his view that returning to a broadened
application of the PAYGO rule would work to the disadvantage of those favoring
continued “tax relief” compared to those favoring continued entitlement growth,
because most of the tax relief requires legislative action to be extended whereas most
entitlement spending increases automatically under existing law.
Further, chairman Grassley discounted the need to broaden the application of
the rule because of the Finance Committee’s current practice of requiring “revenue
neutrality,” except for bipartisan tax relief:
...Two kinds of tax relief bills have come out of the Finance Committee in
the last 4 years.  One set of bills contained widely applicable tax relief.  Those
bills, if you take them together, and they were done under reconciliation, were
bipartisan....Those bills enacted in 2001 and 2003 did not contain offsets.
The second category of bills our committee works on would cover all other
bills coming as part of our committee business.  Those bills dealt with specific
categories of tax relief.  I will give some examples:  A charitable giving tax bill,
the bill to deal with exports in manufacturing, a bill to deal with the Armed
Forces tax relief for our folks in Iraq putting their lives on the line — there are
many other examples of tax relief fully offset by our committee.
In a few rare cases, such as the energy tax relief, for example, bills were
partially offset.
...By and large, then, the Senate Finance Committee, when dealing with tax
policy, has produced revenue-neutral bills.  The exceptions occurred when there
was bipartisan support for widely applicable tax relief.18
Duration.  The points of order set forth in 1974 in the Congressional Budget
Act were established on a permanent basis.  Many of the budget enforcement
mechanisms established in the ensuing decades, either on a statutory basis (such as
CRS-8
19  The Senate’s discretionary spending limits are included in Section 404 of the FY2006
budget resolution as finally agreed to by the House and Senate on April 28, 2005.  In the
conference report to accompany H.Con.Res. 95, H.Rept. 109-62, Apr. 28, 2005, see pp. 22-
23 (legislative text) and pp. 80-83 (joint explanatory statement).
deficit targets, discretionary spending limits, the PAYGO requirement, and the
President’s line item veto authority) or as rulemaking provisions of the House and
Senate (such as changes in the House rules pursuant to the Republicans’ Contract
with America and various “elastic clause” procedures included in annual budget
resolutions), were made effective on a temporary basis.
The trend toward adopting temporary rather than permanent budget enforcement
procedures is attributable to many different factors, but is explained mainly by a
changing budget policy and political environment in which future outcomes are
difficult to predict.  Periods of economic growth may be brief or sustained, but they
inevitably are followed by periods of economic downturn, which may be shallow or
deep.  Shaped by swings in the economic pendulum, changing demographic trends,
and other factors, recent budgets have presented policymakers with drastically
varying issues, ranging from large deficits at times to large surpluses at other times.
Periods of divided government are followed by periods in which one party dominates
the leadership of the federal government; at times party leadership is strongly united,
and at other times it is marked by factional strife.
As a consequence, at any given time in recent decades, it has been difficult for
congressional leaders to determine what budgetary challenges it will face a few years
hence, and how much in the way of political resources it will have to marshal against
them.  Legislative compromises in this type of environment tend to favor shorter-
term deals.  Budget enforcement procedures, as an integral component of shorter-
term compromises on budget policy matters, therefore, often include expiration dates.
Just as budget policies can be revisited in the future, the procedural mechanisms
needed to enforce them can be renegotiated at that later time.
The Senate’s PAYGO rule has fit squarely into this pattern, being revised and
extended over the years through a changing policy and political environment.  The
current PAYGO rule remains in effect for the next three budget cycles, through the
end of FY2008.
Proposals to extend the Senate’s PAYGO rule have assumed the need to retain
an expiration date, rather than to extend it on a permanent basis.  As to the
appropriate length of an extension, a range of options is available.  First, any
modification to the rule could be made without changing the current expiration date
(which is the end of FY2008).  If the PAYGO rule is regarded as a companion
enforcement procedure to the Senate’s discretionary spending limits included in the
FY2006 budget resolution, then comparable expiration dates might be appropriate.
19 Section 404 of the budget resolution sets forth discretionary spending limits for the
Senate for three years, through FY2008.
Second, as proposed in the Feingold amendment to the FY2006 budget
resolution, the expiration date could be made consistent with the five-year time frame
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of the budget resolution itself, through the end of FY2010.  Another provision of the
budget resolution (Section 403) extends many current requirements pertaining to
supermajority enforcement through FY2010.
Third, a much longer time frame could be incorporated into any revision of the
Senate’s PAYGO rule, consistent with any other longer-term procedures that are
finally adopted.  For example, the FY2006 budget resolution includes (in Section
407) a new point of order to constrain legislation increasing direct spending over the
long term, from FY2016 through FY2055.
Other Issues.  Some of the other issues raised by proposals to modify the
Senate PAYGO rule or to establish a PAYGO rule in the House pertain to the
relationship to other budget enforcement procedures and whether the rule may lead
to distortions in budget policy.
Various budget enforcement procedures, each established to deal with a
particular concern, could unnecessarily complicate the legislative process and the
formulation of legislation if they are not well integrated.  Consider, for example,
some of the major budget enforcement procedures that would might apply during
Senate consideration of a legislative proposal to increase direct spending:  (1)
spending increases above the ceilings established in the current budget resolution for
the current fiscal year, the upcoming fiscal year, and a five-year period (or longer)
might be subject to a point of order under Section 311 of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974; (2) spending increases in excess of the committee of jurisdiction’s
spending allocations made under the current budget resolution for the same time
periods might be subject to a point of order under Section 302 of the 1974 act; (3) if
considered as part of a reconciliation bill, spending increases for years beyond the
time frame of the reconciliation instructions might be subject to a point of order as
“extraneous matter” under Section 313 (the “Byrd rule”) of the 1974 act; and (4) if
not assumed in the current budget resolution, spending increases not fully offset over
the first fiscal year, the first five fiscal years, and the next five fiscal years after that
might be subject to a point of order under the current PAYGO rule.  Finally, under
Section 407 of the FY2006 budget resolution, legislation containing net spending
increases that exceed $5 billion during any of four 10-year periods beginning with
FY2016 might be subject to a point of order under that section.
Each of the different procedures identified above serves a distinct purpose
judged to be necessary and valid by the Senate.  The cumulative effect of the various
procedures, however, might be to require a proposal increasing direct spending to
adhere to a mix of deficit-neutrality and fixed-limit requirements over eight different
time periods involving the current fiscal year, the upcoming fiscal year, the first five
fiscal years, the next five fiscal years, and four 10-year periods beginning with
FY2016.  In view of the complexity in the interaction of the procedural requirements,
and the potential complication of legislation as a result, modifications to the PAYGO
rule and other existing budget enforcement procedures, and the addition of new
enforcement procedures, must be carefully evaluated in order to ensure that the
complexity and complications are warranted.
Another concern commonly expressed when budget enforcement procedures are
proposed or modified is whether the change will promote distortions in policy in
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Concurrent Resolution on the Budget: FY2004, S.Prt. 108-19, March 2003.  See the
discussion of the PAYGO rule on pp. 60-61.
order to evade control.  In the case of the PAYGO rule, some argue that excluding
revenue legislation, but not direct spending legislation, from its discipline will
encourage Members to pursue policy initiatives and expansions through the tax side
rather than the spending side of the budget.  Many policies that can be advanced
through the spending of federal funds may also be advanced by granting credits,
deductions, exemptions, and the like under tax laws.  For example, home ownership
is promoted by the federal government through various means, including both
spending for loan subsidies and the individual income tax deduction for home
mortgage interest.
Recent trends in the use of advance appropriations may be cited as an example
by those who express this concern.  As stricter controls were exerted on increases in
discretionary spending in annual appropriations acts, the use of advance
appropriations (which effectively bypass the annual limits) escalated sharply.  To
curb this practice, the House and Senate responded by including limits on advance
appropriations in budget resolutions, enforceable by a point of order in each chamber.
The increased use of staggered effective dates and sunset dates in recent years in tax
legislation, which has increased its complexity, also may be cited as an undesired
consequence of the need to fashion legislation to meet budget enforcement
requirements.
Action in the 108th Congress
During the first session of the 108th Congress, the Senate accepted a
modification of its PAYGO rule recommended by the Senate Budget Committee in
the FY2004 budget resolution, changing it to what is now its current form.  In the
second session, the Senate adopted a floor amendment to restore the PAYGO rule to
its earlier form, but the effort ultimately failed as the two chambers failed to reach
final agreement on the FY2005 budget resolution.  Efforts to establish a PAYGO rule
in the House during action on the budget resolution failed in each session.
First Session.  In 2003, as the first session began, the Senate faced the
prospect of considering the FY2004 budget resolution and adopting it by the statutory
deadline of April 15.  The Senate’s PAYGO rule, which was slated to expire on the
same day, April 15, was expected to become an the issue in the context of
consideration of the budget resolution.
On March 14, the Senate Budget Committee reported S.Con.Res. 23, the budget
resolution, without written report.20  The budget resolution, as reported, included
revenue levels for FY2003-FY2013 that assumed revenue reductions to
accommodate certain tax proposals, such as President George W. Bush’s tax relief
proposals and the permanent extension of certain tax provisions enacted in 2001.  In
addition, it included spending levels that assumed direct spending increases,
including a new Medicare prescription drug benefit, for the same period.  The
reported budget resolution also modified and extended the Senate’s PAYGO rule (to
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2003, pp. 29-30 (Section 505, legislative text of the PAYGO rule) and pp. 118 and 122-123
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what is now its current form), exempting from the rule legislation implementing
those revenue and direct spending assumptions.
After six days of consideration, the Senate agreed to S.Con.Res. 23, as amended,
on March 26, by a vote of 56-44.  While the Senate considered and agreed to several
amendments to S.Con.Res. 23, none were related to the PAYGO provision.
On March 17, the House Budget Committee reported a budget resolution for
FY2004, H.Con.Res. 95, containing revenue and spending levels that assumed tax
cuts and a mix of direct spending increases and reductions.  The reported budget
resolution did not include a PAYGO provision.  The House agreed to H.Con.Res. 95
on March 21, by a vote of 215-212, after rejecting several amendments.  One of the
rejected amendments, offered by Representative Baron Hill, would have, among
other things, established a PAYGO rule in the House applicable to both direct
spending and revenue legislation.21  The amendment was rejected by a vote of 174-
254.
The conference report on the FY2004 budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 95,
retained without change the Senate language relating to the PAYGO rule.22  It also
assumed revenue reductions and direct spending increases, as reflected on a
“PAYGO scorecard,” that would increase the deficit by $1.691 trillion over FY2004-
FY2013.  The House and Senate agreed to the conference report by votes of 216-211
and 51-50, respectively, on April 11.
Second Session.  Modification of the Senate’s PAYGO rule was a recurring
issue in 2004, during the second session, as the House and Senate considered the
FY2005 budget resolution.  Ultimately, the inability of the two chambers to reconcile
their differences over the scope of PAYGO procedures led to an impasse; the House
agreed to the conference report on the FY2005 budget resolution, but the Senate did
not.
On March 5, the Senate Budget Committee reported S.Con.Res. 95, without a
written report.  The budget resolution reflected revenue assumptions, such as the
extension of expiring personal tax relief provisions, that would reduce revenues by
tens of billions of dollars over FY2005-FY2009.  Further, it reflected assumptions
that certain direct spending programs would be increased and others reduced over
this period, yielding a modest net reduction overall.  A print issued by the Budget
Committee indicated that the PAYGO rule adopted in the previous session remained
in effect.23  Accordingly, under the budget resolution as reported, the revenue
reductions and direct spending increases assumed in the budget resolution would not
have been subject to the PAYGO rule.
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On March 10, during the third day of Senate consideration of the budget
resolution, Senator Russell Feingold offered amendment 2748.  The amendment
would have restored the Senate’s PAYGO rule to its earlier form, under which it
applied equally to revenue legislation and direct spending legislation and did not
exempt legislation assumed in the budget resolution.  The Senate adopted the
Feingold amendment later that day by a vote of 51-48.  On March 12, the Senate
adopted S.Con.Res. 95, as amended by the Feingold amendment, among others.
The House Budget Committee, on March 19, reported a budget resolution for
FY2005 (H.Con.Res.  393) also reflecting assumptions that significant reductions in
revenue would be made, coupled with a mix of increases and decreases in direct
spending.24  Also on March 19, the House Budget Committee signaled its interest in
not establishing procedural barriers to the extension of expiring tax cuts and other
policies involving revenue reduction when it reported H.R. 3973, the Spending
Control Act of 2004.25  Among other things, the bill proposed to restore the statutory
PAYGO requirement, but applicable only to direct spending legislation and not
revenue legislation.  The House considered the bill in revised form, as H.R. 4663, on
June 24, 2004, defeating it by a vote of 146-268.  Two amendments and one motion
to recommit the bill with instructions, all of which would have restored the statutory
PAYGO requirement and extended it to both direct spending and revenue legislation,
were defeated.26
On March 25, the House considered and adopted the FY2005 budget resolution,
by a vote of 215-212, after rejecting several amendments.  Two of the rejected
amendments would have, among other things, established a PAYGO rule in the
House applicable to both direct spending and revenue legislation.  The first
amendment, offered by Representatives Baron Hill and Charles Stenholm, was
rejected by a vote of 183-243, and the second amendment, offered by Representative
John Spratt, ranking member of the Budget Committee, was rejected by a vote of
194-232.27
While conference deliberations were underway, the House considered three
motions to instruct House conferees to accept the Senate-passed language modifying
the Senate’s PAYGO rule.28  On March 30, a motion to instruct made by
Representative Mike Thompson was rejected by a tie vote of 209-209.  On May 5 and
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May 12, motions to instruct for the same purpose were made by Representatives
Dennis Moore and Earl Pomeroy, respectively; the motions were rejected by votes
of 208-215 and 207-211.  Finally, Representative David Price announced on May 18
his intention to offer a motion to instruct for the same purpose.  On the next day,
however, the Speaker announced that the motion, which the House had not
considered, was vitiated (because the conferees had reported the budget resolution).
The conference report on S.Con.Res. 95 included language pertaining to the
Senate’s PAYGO rule, as Section 407, but with two further modifications.29  First,
Section 407 exempted from the rule reconciliation legislation considered pursuant
to Title II of the budget resolution.  The title set forth reconciliation directives to the
Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee to report
legislation reducing revenues by $22.9 billion over FY2005-FY2009 (and, in changes
related to tax policy, increasing outlays by $4.6 billion).  Second, Section 407
advanced the expiration date for the PAYGO rule from September 30, 2009, to April
15, 2005, a little less than a year hence.
On May 19, the House agreed to the conference report by a vote of 216-213.
The Senate did not consider the conference report.  In the wake of the failure to
finalize action on the FY2005 budget resolution, each chamber passed a “deeming
resolution” to activate enforcement procedures for the consideration of the FY2005
appropriations acts.30  Because the Senate did not agree to the conference report, and
the “deeming resolution” adopted by the Senate did not address the PAYGO
provision, no changes in the PAYGO rule were made in 2004.
Action in the 109th Congress
In 2005, during action on the FY2006 budget resolution, the Senate considered
and rejected a proposed modification to its PAYGO rule.  In addition, the House
rejected a proposal to establish a PAYGO rule of its own.  The FY2006 budget
resolution, as finally agreed to by the House and Senate, did not include any
provisions dealing with PAYGO rules.
Senate Action.  The Senate Budget Committee considered the FY2006 budget
resolution, S.Con.Res. 18, on March 9 and March 10, 2005.  The “mark” presented
by chairman Judd Gregg included several budget enforcement procedures, generally
made effective through the end of FY2010.  With regard to the Senate’s PAYGO
rule, the mark assumed retention of the current rule without change:
The Mark leaves unchanged the Pay-as-you-go rule in the FY04 Budget
Resolution, the last budget agreed to by the full Congress.  The rule establishes
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a 60-vote point of order against legislation that would increase the deficit beyond
the level assumed in the FY06 Budget Resolution in FY06, the five-year period
from FY06-2010 or the 5-year period from FY11-2016.31
A new enforcement procedure included in the chairman’s mark proposed
additional controls in the Senate, beyond those already provided by the PAYGO rule
and other procedures under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, to control direct
spending over the long term.  Under the procedure, a point of order would lie against
legislation increasing direct spending in the net by more than $5 billion in any of four
consecutive 10-year periods beginning with FY2016 and continuing through FY2055.
The point of order would be subject to waiver by a three-fifths vote.  (This long-term
enforcement mechanism was included in the FY2006 budget resolution, as finally
agreed to by the House and Senate on April 28, 2005, as Section 407.)
During committee action on March 10, Senator Russell Feingold offered an
amendment to extend the current PAYGO rule through FY2010 and to remove the
exemption for revenue and direct spending changes assumed in the budget resolution.
Senator Feingold’s amendment was defeated by a vote of 10-12.32
On March 11, the Senate Budget Committee reported S.Con.Res. 18, without
a written report.33  The reported budget resolution did not include any new language
regarding the Senate’s PAYGO rule; the new rule pertaining to control of direct
spending over the long term was included as Section 407 (Limitation on Long-Term
Spending Proposals).
The Senate began consideration of S.Con.Res. 18 on March 14.  On March 16,
Senator Russell Feingold offered amendment 186, which was identical to the
modification to the Senate’s PAYGO rule that he had offered during committee
markup of the budget resolution.34  The amendment was rejected by a tie vote of 50-
50.
On March 17, the Senate adopted S.Con.Res. 18, as modified by various
amendments, by a vote of 51-49.
House Action.  The House Budget Committee considered and adopted the
FY2006 budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 95, on March 9, 2005.  The “mark” presented
by chairman Jim Nussle included several budget enforcement procedures, but none
of them pertained to a PAYGO rule for the House.  During committee markup of the
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budget resolution, two amendments that would have established a PAYGO rule in
the House were rejected.35
On March 16 and March 17, the House considered H.Con.Res. 95 under the
terms of a special rule reported by the House Rules Committee, H.Res. 154.36  One
of the four amendments made in order under the rule was a substitute amendment
offered by Representative John Spratt, the ranking member of the House Budget
Committee.  Among other things, the amendment proposed (in Section 301) that a
PAYGO rule be established in the House.37  Under the proposed rule, a point of order
could be raised against direct spending or revenue legislation that would cause (or
increase) an on-budget deficit during any of the same three periods defined in the
Senate’s PAYGO rule.  The rule would not exempt direct spending increases or
revenue reductions assumed in the budget resolution.  Section 301(d) of the proposed
rule provides for its termination on December 31, 2015.  On March 17, the Spratt
amendment was defeated by a vote of 165-264.
The House adopted the budget resolution without amendment on March 17, by
a vote of 218-214.
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Appendix A.  Text of the Senate’s “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAYGO)
Rule
Sec.  505 of the FY2004 Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res.  95, 108th Congress)
Sec.  505.  Pay-As-You-Go Point of Order in the Senate.
(a) Point of Order. — 
(1) In General. — It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any
direct spending or revenue legislation that would increase the on-budget deficit
or cause an on-budget deficit for any one of the three applicable time periods as
measured in paragraphs (5) and (6).
(2) Applicable Time Periods. — For purposes of this subsection, the term
“applicable time period” means any 1 of the 3 following periods:
A) The first year covered by the most recently adopted concurrent
resolution on the budget.
(B) The period of the first 5 fiscal years covered by the most recently
adopted concurrent resolution on the budget.
(C) The period of the 5 fiscal years following the first 5 fiscal years
covered in the most recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget.
(3) Direct-Spending Legislation. — For purposes of this subsection and
except as provided in paragraph (4), the term “direct-spending legislation”
means any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that
affects direct spending as that term is defined by, and interpreted for purposes
of, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
(4) Exclusion. — For purposes of this subsection, the terms “direct-
spending legislation” and “revenue legislation” do not include — 
(A) any concurrent resolution on the budget; or
(B) any provision of legislation that affects the full funding of, and
continuation of, the deposit insurance guarantee commitment in effect on
the date of enactment of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.
(5) Baseline. — Estimates prepared pursuant to this section shall — 
(A) use the baseline surplus or deficit used for the most recently
adopted concurrent resolution on the budget as adjusted for any changes
in revenues or direct spending assumed by such resolution; and
(B) be calculated under the requirements of subsections (b) through
(d) of section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
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Act of 1985 for fiscal years beyond those covered by that concurrent
resolution on the budget.
(6) Prior Surplus. — If direct spending or revenue legislation increases the
on-budget deficit or causes an on-budget deficit when taken individually, it must
also increase the on-budget deficit or cause an on-budget deficit when taken
together with all direct spending and revenue legislation enacted since the
beginning of the calendar year not accounted for in the baseline under paragraph
(5)(A), except that direct spending or revenue effects resulting in net deficit
reduction enacted pursuant to reconciliation instructions since the beginning of
that same calendar year shall not be available.
(b) Waiver. — This section may be waived or suspended in the Senate only by
the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn.
(c) Appeals. — Appeals in the Senate from the decisions of the Chair relating
to any provision of this section shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided
between, and controlled by, the appellant and the manager of the bill or joint
resolution, as the case may be. An affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Members of
the Senate, duly chosen and sworn, shall be required to sustain an appeal of the ruling
of the Chair on a point of order raised under this section.
(d) Determination of Budget Levels. — For purposes of this section, the levels
of new budget authority, outlays, and revenues for a fiscal year shall be determined
on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget of the Senate.
(e) Sunset. — This section shall expire on September 30, 2008
